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Abstract
Daughters are the principal caregivers of their dependent parents. In this pa-
per, we study long-term care (LTC) choices by bargaining families with mixed- or
same-gender siblings. LTC care can be provided either informally by children, or
formally at home or in an institution. A social norm implies that daughters su¤er
a psychological cost when they provide less informal care than the average child.
We show that the laissez-faire (LF) and the utilitarian rst-best (FB) di¤er for
two reasons. First, because informal care imposes a negative externality on daugh-
ters via the social norm, too much informal care is provided in LF. Second, the
weights children and parents have in the family bargaining problem might di¤er in
general from their weights in social welfare. We show that the FB allocation can
be achieved through a system of subsidies on formal home and institutional care.
Except when children and parents have equal bargaining weights these subsidies
are gender-specic and reect Pigouvian as well as paternalisticconsiderations.
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1 Introduction
The provision of adequate long-term care (LTC) to the dependent elderly represents a
major challenge faced by all developed countries. While this problem is already looming
right now, it will become even more pressing during the decades to come because of pop-
ulation aging. Elderly people who are a¤ected by cognitive diseases, like Altzheimers
or other forms of dementia, or by motoric problems due to ALS or Parkinsons dis-
ease need assistance with their daily activities. These LTC services can be delivered
either formally at home or in institutions, or informally by family members. LTC is not
covered by health insurance and only a few countries have specic systems of adequate
LTC insurance coverage. As a result most LTC is currently provided informally either
by spouses when still alive or, more signicantly, by a persons children.1
Bott et al. (2017) in a recent article on dementia and informal care in the US argue
that The best long-term care insurance is a conscientious daughter. Indeed, among
adult children taking care of their old parents, daughters typically provide more informal
care than sons (Arber and Ginn, 1990; Bracke et al., 2008; Haberkern and Szydlik, 2010;
Schmid et al., 2012; Tolkacheva et al., 2014). Coward and Dwyer (1990), for instance,
consider the 1982 US National Long-Term Care Survey and the National Survey of
Informal Caregivers and nd that: within all sibling network categories, daughters
were more likely than sons to be providing care to an impaired parent [. . . ]. Jakobsson
et al. (2016) show that, when the rationing of formal home care is guided by statistical
discrimination, the gender gap in informal care provision is even exacerbated. In
particular, the authors document how, in Norway, impaired old people receive less
formal care when they have a daughter. This is because, when assigning formal LTC
to citizens in need, managers take into account a patients family situation and the
fact that daughters typically provide more informal care. Hence, the gender gap in
care provision is even self-reinforcing since daughters will have to compensate the lower
1Norton (2000) estimates the share of informal care at about 2/3 of total LTC.
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amount of formal care received by their parents with a larger provision of informal care.
This paper deals with the gender gap in care provision and analyzes the choices
within the family which contribute to its emergence. Our explanation is based on two
factors. First, sons and daughters have unequal job market opportunities which determ-
ine their opportunity cost of providing care. Second, there is a social norm according
to which society expects daughters to be the main caregivers of their parents and which
imposes a utility cost on daughters who deviate from this norm. Gender di¤erences in
wages are well documented and continue to exist in all OECD countries, where women
with a median wage earn on average 15% percent less than their male counterpart (see
for instance, ONeill, 2003; Fortin, 2005; Blau and Kahn, 2006). The role of social norms
is empirically more di¢ cult to assess; they represent by their very nature a less tangible
concept than opportunity costs. Haberkern and Szydlik (2010) nd that the extent to
which providing informal care to needy family member is considered a moral obligation
varies between countries. They show that of those aged 65+ in the northern countries
interviewed by SHARE believed that the state should bear the primary responsibility
for LTC, while in Mediterranean countries, the majority believed that the family should
mainly be responsible. Further, they show that where the consensus that care is a fam-
ily matter is strongest, the share of informal care provided by daughters is also largest.
On the other hand, institutions and social norms did not inuence care relationships
with sons. In a similar vein, Kotsadam (2011) nds that there is link between gendered
norms and informal care provision by women, and that the strength of this link var-
ies within European countries and is strongest for Germany and Southern European
countries. Our model explains how these documented facts a¤ect families LTC ar-
rangements, shows that they reects an ine¢ cient equilibrium, and studies potentially
welfare improving policies.
We consider long-term care choices by daughters and sons in a society in which fam-
ilies consist either of mixed-gender or same-gender siblings. LTC care can be provided
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informally at home, or formally at home or in an institution. LTC decision are made
through a cooperative bargaining procedure within each family. Since cooperation guar-
antees that the outcome is on the familys Pareto frontier, the solution can be charac-
terized by maximizing a weighted sum of parents and childrens utilities. Providing
informal care has two types of costs for siblings. The rst is the opportunity cost of
lost labor income and is gender-specic because of a gender wage gap. The second one
is family-specic and captures all the other costs of informal LTC, including material
and psychological costs. The rst cost is mainly relevant for the intensive margin of
informal LTC, while the second one is relevant for the extensive margin (the choice
between home care and an institution). A social norm inicts a psychological cost on
daughters when they do not provide enough informal LTC at home.2 The cost of the
social norm is increasing in the amount of informal LTC provided by the average child
in society. The result is that informal care provided by sons and daughters exerts a
negative externality on daughters not providing informal care.
We also determine the socially optimal solution, that is the allocation that maxim-
izes a utilitarian social welfare function. Following the tradition of public and welfare
economics, social welfare is based on individual (as opposed to family) utility. This
introduces a paternalisticdimension into social preferences in the sense that society
weights individuals equally irrespective of their bargaining weights within their respect-
ive families.
We show that the laissez-faire (LF) and the utilitarian rst-best (FB) di¤er for two
reasons. First, because informal care imposes a negative externality on daughters via
the social norm, the equilibrium will be ine¢ cient. In other words, while the solution is
on the Pareto frontier within every family, it is not Pareto e¢ cient for the economy as
a whole. The externality will imply too much informal care so that the levels of both
2Our results do not change when there is also a social norm for sons, as long as their norm cost is
lower or not too much larger than the cost for daughters.
4
formal home and institutional care will be too small. Consequently, it is possible to
make both children and parents better o¤ through a suitably designed LTC policy.
Second, the LF di¤ers from the social optimum because the weights children and
parents have in the family bargaining problem di¤er in general from their weights in
social welfare. Thus, even when there is no social norm, so that the LF is on the Pareto-
frontier, the solution will not be socially optimal. In that case a Pareto-improvement
is not possible, but the utilitarian social welfare function calls for a move along the
Pareto-frontier to make either the caregivers or the parents better o¤, depending on the
family bargaining weights. In the general case where both social norms and di¤erent
weights apply, the two e¤ects just described are of course intertwined. However, it is
insightful to keep them in mind and to look at special cases where only one of them
applies.
To study policy design we assume away any ad hoc restrictions on the set of feasible
instruments. In particular, subsidies or taxes can be gender-specic. We show that the
FB can be implemented through a system of subsidies on formal home and institutional
care, nanced by a uniform lump-sum tax. When parents and children have identical
bargaining weights, so that families maximize the sum of parents and childrens utilities,
a simple uniform Pigouvian subsidy is su¢ cient. The same subsidy rate applies to all
modes of formal care (home and institutional) irrespective of the gender of the siblings.
When intra-family weights di¤er across generations, optimal subsidies must be gender-
specic. Both e¢ ciency and paternalistic (weight-related) e¤ects are now relevant. They
reinforce each other when parents have the higher weights, so that all the net subsidies
are positive and exceed the Pigouvian levels. Daughters are now subject to a double
jeopardy and su¤er both from the social norm and from their lower weight in the fam-
ily. Sons, on the other hand, do not care about the social norm, but their informal care
contributes to the externality (which is not accounted for in their private decision). In
addition, their informal care is inated (compared to the utilitarian benchmark) by the
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higher weight of the parents. To sum up, too much informal care is provided in the LF
and this calls for subsidies on all modes of formal care.
Finally, when children have a higher weight than their parents e¢ ciency and pater-
nalism go in opposite directions. Then, it may become optimal to discourage one or
both types of formal care.
2 The setup
We consider a population of families. Each family consists of two adult siblings and one
old and impaired parent.3 Children are randomly matched two by two. Given that 50%
of children are sons and 50% are daughters, three types of families exist: 1/2 of siblings
are mixed, that is they are composed of one son and one daughter (s; d), and 1/4 of
siblings are composed of two sons (s; s), or two daughters (d; d) respectively. While
parents are economically inactive and only consume care, the children participate in the
labor market. The extent to which they do depends on their informal care provision.
We normalize all available time to one, and we assume that parents need full-time care.
Two modes of care for the elderly exist: informal LTC provided by adult children
and formal market care. Formal care can either be provided at the parents home, or in
a nursing home. We denote informal LTC provision by ai (i = s; d), while that bought
in the private market by ap. The latter costs p per unit of time. The parents utility
of informal care is given by u(ai + aj) (i; j = s; d) and it is given by u(ap) for formal
care with  2 (0; 1]. We let u0 > 0; u00 < 0 and u(0) = 0. Informal and private LTC
are thus imperfect substitutes, with private LTC being (weakly) less welfare enhancing
than informal care.4 When old parent enter the nursing home they receive full-time
assistance and ap = 1; with u(1) > p.
3This parent is usually the person who took care of his/her spouse before widowhood.
4There are several papers that suggest that di¤erent forms of care are, at least to some extent,
substitutable (see, e.g., van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Charles and Sevak, 2005; and Stabile et al.,
2006).
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When adult children provide LTC their labor income decreases proportionally to the
time devoted to care. Sons receive an income w(1 as) while daughters receive an income
w(1   ad), where  2 (0; 1] reects the gender wage gap for female workers as it is
observed in nearly all developed countries.5 A decrease in labor income is not the unique
opportunity cost of providing informal LTC. Informal care also comes with material and
psychological costs for the care provider and these costs di¤er between families due to
di¤erent living situations, or family ties.6 We denote those costs c(ai) and assume that,
for a given family, they only take two values: c(0) = 0 and c(ai) = c; 8ai > 0; where
c 2 [0; cmax] is family-specic and is distributed according to the cumulative density
function F (c) which is equal for all three types of families.
Daughters are confronted with a social norm concerning LTC activities. This norm is
motivated by the empirical evidence mentioned in the introduction showing that women
are the principal caregivers in the family. We assume that daughters feel guilt when
they provide less informal LTC than the average amount provided by adult children in
the society denoted by a. Formally, we represent the norm for daughters as the costs
maxf0; a   adg. The parameter  2 [0; 1] reects the psychological costs from norm
deviations.
Families maximize the weighted sum of utilities, with  2 (0; 1) being the weight of
the siblingsutility and 1    being the weight of the parents utility. The weights are
the same in all families. We dene   (1   )= as the relative weight of the parent.
When  = 1 ,  = 1=2 the young and old generation have equal weights. When
instead  < (>)1 ,  > (<)1=2; the old generation has a lower (higher) weight than
the young one. Unequal weights capture situations in which the bargaining power of
the two generations di¤er. To the best of our knowledge no empirical evidence on the
relative size of intergenerational weights exists so that both cases are equally possible
5See, among others, ONeill (2003); Fortin (2005); Blau and Kahn (2006).
6For a more in-depth analysis of the costs of informal care provision see, for instance, Carmichael
and Charles (1998).
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and the likelihood that one or the other realizes is related to the strength of family ties
in society.
To sum up, families di¤er in two respects: rst, in the gender mix of the siblings
and, second, in the material and psychological costs c.
3 Familieschoices
In this section we study familieschoice of the mode of formal LTC and the siblings
allocation of time between work and informal care in case the old parent remains at
home.
Mixed-gender families. First, let us consider a family composed of a son and a
daughter. A type-(s; d) familys optimization problem when informal LTC is provided
within the family is given by:
max
as;ad
W 1sd = [w(1  as) + w(1  ad)  pap   c(as)  c(ad)  maxf0; a  adg]
+ (1  ) [u(as + ad) + u(ap)] ; s.t. as + ad + ap = 1:
Given the time constraint, the amount of home formal care is ap = 1  as   ad and the
corresponding familys expenditure amount to p(1  as   ad):
Together with the decrease in labor income, informal care providers incur a utility
cost c(ai); i = s; d. In addition, the daughter is negatively a¤ected by the social norm
whenever she provides less informal care than the average amount of care, a; provided
in society.
The rst order conditions (FOCs) with respect to the sons and the daughters
informal care provision, as and ad, are given by:
as :   [w   p] + (1  )[u0(as + ad)  u0(1  as   ad)]  0;
ad :   [w   p  I] + (1  )[u0(as + ad)  u0(1  as   ad)]  0;
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where I 2 f0; 1g is an indicator function that takes on the value one when the social
norm is binding and zero otherwise. The net marginal costs for each sibling (weighted
by the weight of her/his generation) are given by the rst term in brackets while the
net marginal benet to the parent (weighted by the weight of her/his generation) is
presented by the second term in brackets. Due to the gender wage gap, w < w, and
the (possible) costs of the social norm, I, the marginal costs of informal care provision
are lower for the daughter than for the son so that only the daughter will provide
informal LTC and as = 0. The optimal amount of informal care, ad, is thus implicitly
determined by:
ad : w   p  I = [u0(ad)  u0(1  ad)]: (1)
When the old parent has the lower weight in the family ( < 1), the net marginal
benet from informal care is reduced and ad decreases accordingly.
When informal LTC is provided, welfare in the (s; d) family is given by:
W 1sd =  [w + w(1  ad)  p(1  ad)  c  maxf0; a  adg]+(1 ) [u(ad) + u(1  ad)] :
The alternative to informal LTC provision is a nursing home. In this case ap = 1 and
the disutility from the social norm su¤ered by the daughter is maxf0; a   0g = a.
Welfare of a type-(s; d) family is then:
W 0sd =  [w + w   p  a] + (1  )u(1):
The family opts for the nursing home if it is welfare maximizing, that is if
W 1sd W 0sd , c^sd  c;
where the critical costs, csd, are dened by:
c^sd  [(p  w)ad + maxf0; a  adg+ a] + [u(ad) + [u(1  ad)  u(1)]]:
For the share F (c^sd) of type-(s; d) families it is welfare maximizing to provide informal
care while for the share 1  F (c^sd) of these families it is optimal that the parent enters
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a nursing home. The critical cost level and thus the share of families providing informal
care is thereby increasing in the norm costs , and in the relative weight of the parent,
. Hence, when  < 1; the two economic forces push in opposite directions: the social
norm causes the share of families choosing a nursing home to decrease and a lower
weight for the parent causes it to increase.7
Two-daughter families. Now consider a family with two daughters (d; d). When
they provide informal care, their optimization problem is given by:
max
ad1;ad2
W 1dd =[w(1  ad1) + w(1  ad2)  pap   c(ad1)  c(ad2)
  f0; a  ad1g   f0; a  ad2g] + (1  )[u(ad1 + ad2) + u(ap)]:
Di¤erently from before, both daughters are possibly negatively a¤ected by the social
norm. Noting that ap = 1   ad1   ad2, the FOC with respect to both ad1 and ad2 is
given by:
ad1; a

d2 :  [w   p  I] + (1  )[u0(ad1 + ad2)  u0(1  ad1   ad2)]  0:
Since the FOCs of the two daughters coincide, only one of them will provide informal
LTC so that the xed cost c is not duplicated. We assume this to be daughter d1 so
that ad2 = 0 and a

d1 is implicitly determined by:
ad1 : w   p  I = [u0(ad1)  u0(1  ad1)]:
Note that informal LTC in a two-daughter family coincides with informal care in a mixed
family (see expression 1) and we dene ad1  ad. The daughter who is not providing
7Accounting for a social norm for sons would imply a cost smaxf0; a   asg: Results would not
change qualitatively provided that the cost of deviating from the norm is not more salient for sons (s
should not be too high). The results would be reversed with sons providing care in mixed gender families
only when s > d, and the di¤erence is su¢ ciently large to outweigh the di¤erence in opportunity costs
implied by the gender wage gap.
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informal care is su¤ering a disutility from the social norm given by a. Welfare in a
type-(d; d) family with informal care provision can thus be written as:
W 1dd =[w(1  ad) + w   p(1  ad)  c  maxf0; a  adg   a]
+ (1  )[u(ad) + u(1  ad)]:
If a type-(d; d) family instead fully relies on market care, welfare amounts to:
W 0dd = [2w   p  2a] + (1  )u(1):
Now the cost of the social norm is counted twice, because both sisters feel guilt when
their parent enters the nursing home. The latter will be the case if it yields a higher
welfare, that is if
W 1dd W 0dd , c^dd  c;
where
c^dd  [(p  w)ad + maxf0; a  adg+ a] + [u(ad) + [u(1  ad)  u(1)]]:
Given that all daughters provide the same amount of informal care ad; the critical values
c^dd = c^

sd  c^d are the same, as well as the share of (d; d) and (s; d) families for whom
it is better to provide informal care: F (c^dd) = F (c^

sd)  F (c^d).
Two-son families. Finally, consider a family with two sons (s; s). The social norm
is not relevant in this family and the optimization problem writes:
max
as1;as2
W 1ss =[w(1  as1) + w(1  as2)  pap   c(as1)  c(as2)]
+ (1  )[u(as1 + as2) + u(1  ap)]
Noting that ap = 1  as1   as2 the FOCs with respect to both as1 and as2 is given by:
as1; a

s2 :  [w   p] + (1  )[u0(as1 + as2)  u0(1  as1   as2)]  0
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Again, to avoid cost duplication only one son will provide care, which we assume to be
son s1 so that as2 = 0. Hence, informal LTC in a two-son family as  as1 is chosen
such that the net opportunity costs in terms of labor income equals the (weighted) net
marginal benet of informal LTC to the parent
as : w   p = [u0(as)  u0(1  as)]: (2)
Comparing (1) with (2) reveals that as < ad since both the gender wage gap and the
norm costs reduce the opportunity cost of informal LTC provision for daughters. In a
type-(s; s) family welfare when informal care is provided can thus be written as:
W 1ss = [w(1  as) + w   p(1  as)  c] + (1  )[u(as) + u(1  as)]:
When instead the parent enters the nursing home, welfare is given by:
W 0ss = [2w   p] + (1  )u(1)
The nursing home is welfare maximizing if
W 1ss W 0ss , c^ss  c;
where
c^ss  (p  w)as +[u(as) + [u(1  as)  u(1)]]:
For type-(s; s) families the social norm does not a¤ect the critical cost level c^ss and thus
the share of families providing informal care F (c^ss); however, when the parent has the
lower weight in the family ( < 1) this still reduces F (c^ss).8
4 Laissez-faire allocation
We are now in the position to characterize the laissez faire allocation. To do so, we rst
derive the average amount of informal care provided in the population. Then, we show
how the social norm a¤ects daughters in our society.
8The model can account for only-child families. Our ananysis immediatly implies that the unique
child would behave either as sibling d1 or as sibling s1 of same-gender families.
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Recall that daughters provide the same level of informal care, ad; in type-(s; d) and
(d; d) families. The latter correspond to 1=2 and 1=4 of families in the population.
Moreover, the critical cost value, c^d; is the same in both types of families. Average
informal care in the society is thus given by:
a =

1
2
F (c^sd) +
1
4
F (c^dd)

ad +
1
4
F (c^ss)a

s
=
3
4
F (c^d)a

d +
1
4
F (c^ss)a

s: (3)
where ad and a

s are dened in (1) and (2) respectively. Given that a

s < a

d, expression
(3) shows that as < a < ad, or that daughters provide more than the average amount
of informal care while sons provide less than the average amount of care in society. The
latter implies that the norm is never binding for daughters who provide informal care
so that I = 0 and
ad : w   p = [u0(ad)  u0(1  ad)] (4)
Let us sum up the impact of the social norm on the laissez-faire allocation. In families
in which informal care is provided, the norm uniquely a¤ects type-(d; d) families where
the sister who is working full-time feels guilt of not providing care. However, the social
norm has always an impact on families with at least one daughter if the parent enters
the nursing home.
The critical cost level within the three family types can thus be rewritten as:
c^sd = c^

dd = c^

d (p  w)ad + a +[u(ad) + [u(1  ad)  u(1)]] (5)
c^ss = c^

s (p  w)as +[u(as) + [u(1  as)  u(1)]]: (6)
It is larger in type-(s; d) and (d; d) families than in type-(s; s) families: c^s < c^d. This
translates in a larger share of type-(s; s) families where the parent enters the nursing
home, that is F (c^s) < F (c^d).
The following proposition provides a characterization of the laissez-faire allocation.
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Proposition 1 (Laissez-faire allocation) (i) When the parent does not enter the
nursing home, informal LTC is provided by a single sibling. Except in type-(s; s)
families this will be a daughter.
(ii) The levels of informal care are determined by (2) and (4). They satisfy: as <
a < ad, where a
 is the average level of informal care dened by (3).
(iii) Daughters characterized by a cost c lower than c^d; in type-(s; d) and (d; d) families,
will provide informal care. Sons characterized by a cost c lower that c^s will provide
informal care in type-(s; s) families. The marginal siblings c^d and c^

s are dened
by (5) and (6) respectively, and are such that c^s < c^d.
(iv) All daughters not providing informal care su¤er from the presence of the social
norm.
The cost of the social norm depends on a, familiesdecisions are thus related in
many ways. First, in all type-(d; d) and (s; d) families opting for the nursing home, the
disutility from the social norm is a¤ected by the choices as and ad taken by all families
providing informal care. Second, the cost value of the indi¤erent sibling c^d not only
depends on the amount of informal care provided by daughters in the corresponding
type of family, but also on informal care decisions made by all other types of families
and on the indi¤erent siblings in type-(s; s) families, c^s (see expression 5).
5 First-best allocation
We now characterize the rst-best solution in order to analyze the laissez-faire ine¢ -
ciencies created by the existence of the social norm on the one side, and by the unequal
generational weights on the other side. We consider a utilitarian social welfare function
given by the sum of utilities of the three types of families, weighted by their respective
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shares, and which takes the social norm into account. In other words, welfare corres-
ponds to the sum of utility of all individuals. Observe that this is in line with families
objective function when  = 1, which corresponds precisely to the case where the par-
ent receives the same weight as each of the children.9 When  6= 1, social and family
weights di¤er which introduces a paternalisticdimension.
Recall that an allocation species the amount of informal LTC provided by sons
and daughters, and the individual cost of providing informal LTC characterizing the
siblings who are indi¤erent between providing and not providing informal LTC in the
three types of families. Hence, we have to determine ass; asd; add; c^ss; c^sd and c^dd that
maximize the following social welfare function:
max
ass;asd;add;c^ss;c^sd;c^dd
SW =
1
2
Z c^sd
0
W 1sdf(c)dc+ [1  F (c^sd)]W 0sd

(7)
+
1
4
Z c^dd
0
W 1ddf(c)dc+ [1  F (c^dd)]W 0dd

+
1
4
Z c^ss
0
W 1ssf(c)dc+ [1  F (c^ss)]W 0ss

;
where, given that the young and old generation are weighted equally, families welfare
9 In the original specication with ; each family maximizes (with obvious notation) UP + (1  
)(UC1 + UC2). With  = 1=2 (or  = 1) this yields
1
2
(UP + UC1 + UC2) ;
which corresponds to the maximization of the sum of utilities. We obtain the same social welfare
function (7) if each individual is given a weight of 1=3. All this is just a matter of normalization.
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levels are given by:
W 1sd =w + w(1  ad)  p(1  ad)  c  maxf0; a  adg+ u(ad) + u(1  ad);
W 0sd =w + w   p  a+ u(1);
W 1dd =w(1  ad1) + w   p(1  ad1)  c  maxf0; a  ad1g   a+ u(ad1) + u(1  ad1);
W 0dd =2w   p  2a+ u(1);
W 1ss =w(1  as1) + w   p(1  as1)  c+ u(as1) + u(1  as1);
W 0ss =2w   p+ u(1):
Note that, in the above expressions for familieswelfare (W 1sd; W
1
dd and W
1
ss) only one
sibling is providing informal care in each family so that xed costs are not duplicated.
Moreover, in type-(s; d) families it is optimal, given the gender wage gap, that the
daughter takes the role of the caregiver.
The optimal levels of informal LTC are derived in Appendix A. As in the laissez
faire, daughters in type-(s; d) and in (d; d) families provide the same amount of informal
care
 
aFBsd = a
FB
dd  aFBd

which solves:
aFBd : w   p+ ' = u0(aFBd )  u0(1  aFBd ): (8)
Informal care provided by sons in type-(s; s) families instead solves:
aFBs : w   p+ ' = u0(aFBs )  u0(1  aFBs ): (9)
The right hand side (RHS) in (8) and (9) reects the net marginal benet of informal
care provision to the parent while the left hand side (LHS) indicates the sum of the
private and the social marginal cost of informal care. In particular, the social marginal
cost of informal care is captured by the term ' and is dened by:
'  

1
2
[1  F (c^FBsd )] + 2
1
4
[1  F (c^FBdd )] +
1
4
F (c^FBdd )

: (10)
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The above term collects all marginal e¤ects of informal care provided by sons and
daughters on the average amount of informal care aFB and its expression reects the
total negative externality imposed by informal care providers on all daughters who do
not provide care. Specically, the rst two terms in brackets reect the costs of all
daughters in type-(s; d) and (d; d) families in which parents enter the nursing home.10
The third term captures the costs of sisters not providing informal care in type-(d; d)
families where parents stay at home. Note that, due to the gender wage gap, it is
optimal that daughters provide (weakly) more informal care than sons, i.e. aFBs  aFBd :
As shown in Appendix A the e¢ cient critical cost level for daughters c^FBsd = c^
FB
dd 
c^FBd and sons c^
FB
ss  c^FBs are given by:
c^FBd (p  w)aFBd + aFB + u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]  'aFBd ; (11)
c^FBs (p  w)aFBs + u(aFBs ) + [u(1  aFBs )  u(1)]  'aFBs : (12)
As in the laissez-faire, given that all female caregivers optimally provide the same
amount of informal care, the indi¤erent daughter in type-(s; d) and (d; d) families is
the same. In addition, it is optimal that the share of type-(s; s) families in which the
parent enters the nursing home is larger than the corresponding share of type-(s; d) and
(d; d) families:
c^FBs  c^FBd :
Finally, the optimal average informal care in society is given by:
aFB =

1
2
F (c^FBsd ) +
1
4
F (c^FBdd )

aFBd +
1
4
F (c^FBss )a
FB
s
=
3
4
F (c^FBd )a
FB
d +
1
4
F (c^FBs )a
FB
s (13)
which is composed of the same terms as in the laissez-faire, but where the values of
c^d; ad; c^s and as di¤er, as we will discuss in the next section. Considering that c^FBsd =
10The second term in (10) is counted twice because there are two sisters in type-(d; d) families.
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c^FBdd  c^FBd ; the social marginal costs ' dened in (10) simplify to:
'  

1  3
4
F (c^FBd )

; (14)
where the costs of deviating from the social norm, ; are multiplied by the whole share
of daughters su¤ering from the norm in the society.
The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (First-best allocation) (i) When the parent does not enter the nurs-
ing home, informal LTC is provided by a single sibling. Except in type-(s; s) fam-
ilies this will always be a daughter.
(ii) The optimal levels of informal care are determined by (8) and (9) and satisfy
aFBs < a
FB < aFBd ; where a
FB is the average level of informal care dened by
(13). aFBs and a
FB
d take into account the marginal social cost of informal care, ';
dened in (14), or the negative externality imposed by informal care providers on
all daughters who are not providing informal care.
(iii) Daughters characterized by a cost c lower than c^FBd ; in type-(s; d) and (d; d) famil-
ies, will provide informal care. Sons characterized by a cost c lower than c^FBs will
provide informal care in type-(s; s) families. The marginal siblings c^FBd and c^
FB
s
are dened by (11) and (12) and satisfy c^FBs < c^
FB
d .
6 Policy design
The results presented in the previous sections have shown that the LF and the utilitarian
FB di¤er for two reason. First, through the social norm, informal care imposes a negative
externality on daughters. Because of this externality the equilibrium will be ine¢ cient.
Ceteris paribus it will imply too much informal care so that the levels of both formal
home and institutional care will be too small. Observe that this ine¢ ciency implies that
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the equilibrium is not on the Pareto frontier. Consequently, it is possible to make both
children and parents better o¤ through a suitably designed LTC policy.
Second, the LF di¤ers from the social optimum because the weights children and
parents have in the family bargaining problem di¤er in general (unless  = 1) from
their weights in social welfare. Thus, even when there is no social norm, so that the
LF is on the Pareto-frontier, the solution will not be socially optimal. In that case a
Pareto-improvement is not possible but the utilitarian social welfare function calls for a
move along the Pareto-frontier to make either the caregivers or the parents better o¤,
depending on the family bargaining weights. In the general case where both social norms
and di¤erent weights apply, the two e¤ects just described are of course intertwined.
However, it is insightful to keep them in mind and to look at special cases where only
one of them applies.
We now turn to the design of long term care policies. Specically, we examine how
the FB allocation can be implemented through such policies. The following proposition
is established in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 The utilitarian rst-best solution can be implemented by a system of lin-
ear gender-specic (positive or negative) subsidies on formal home care, s and d, and
on institutional care, s and d, nanced by a uniform lump-sum tax. The implementing
subsidies are given by
s = (  1)[w   p] + ' (15)
d = (  1)[w   p] + ' (16)
for formal home care and by
s =(1  aFBs )s + 'aFBs + (  1)[u(aFBs ) + [u(1  aFBs )  u(1)]] (17)
d =(1  aFBd )d + 'aFBd + (  1)[u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]] (18)
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for institutional care, where s and s apply when both siblings are male while d and
d apply when at least one of the siblings is female.
The expressions for these subsidies reect the two e¤ects just mentioned. Further-
more, the signs of the subsidies tell us which of the two e¤ects is stronger and in which
direction the LF has to be corrected to achieve the optimal solution. More precisely,
using expressions (2) and (4) for the LF, and (8) (9) for the FB, it follows that
s R 0 , as R aFBs ;
d R 0 , ad R aFBd :
In words, the subsidy on formal home care in any given family is positive if the level
of informal care provided in the LF is too large and it is negative in the opposite case.
This is quite in line with intuition: when the LF implies too much informal care we can
reduce it by subsidizing the closest substitute, namely formal home care.
For institutional care the interpretation of the sign is a bit more complicated. First,
to get a meaningful expression to interpret we have to consider the net subsidies, rather
than just the value of s and d. This is given by s   (1  aFBs )s for two-son families
and by d   (1  aFBd )d for all others. These expressions e¤ectively measure the extra
subsidy a family receives when switching from formal home to institutional care and it
is of course this level which is relevant for the choice between the two modes of care.
Second, the comparisons depend on as and ad which are not the same in the LF and
in the FB. In type-(s; s) families, dening the LF and FB levels of c^ss conditional on
given levels of as and ad, we obtain from (6) and (12) that
c^FBs (as) R c^s(as) , (1 )[u(as) + [u(1  as)  u(1)]] R 'as;
so that from (17) we have
c^FBs (a
FB
s ) R c^s(aFBs ) , s   (1  aFBs )s Q 0:
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Roughly speaking, for the sons the net subsidy on institutional care is positive when
the LF level of c^ is too large, so that not enough institutional care is provided.11
For the daughters the interpretation of the expression is more complicated, because
the expression for the cost levels of the marginal daughters in the LF, (5), and in the
FB, (11), are not closed-form solutions, as the a on the RHS depends on the c^s. We
shall nevertheless examine the sign of the net subsidy and take it as an indication in
which direction the level of institutional care needs to be corrected, keeping in mind
that LF and FB levels of c^ have to be compared conditional on given levels of a. Though
intuitive and formally correct, our comparison thus has to be interpreted with care.
To understand the trade-o¤s which are involved, it is interesting to consider the two
special cases (equal weights and no norm) already mentioned. When family and social
weights coincide, we have
 = 1 , s = d = s = d = ':
In that case the solution is particularly simple. Not surprisingly a uniform subsidy on all
types of formal care which is set according to the Pigouvian rule equal to the marginal
social damage is su¢ cient. The uniformity of the subsidy is due to the fact that a
childrens informal care a¤ects a in the same way, irrespective of their gender. In other
words, while the norm a¤ects only daughters, the benchmark (average) level of care is
gender neutral.
In the other extreme case, when there is no social norm we have  = ' = 0.
Expressions (15) and (18) then imply that the subsidies on formal home care s and d
as well as the net subsidy on institutional care, s   (1  aFBs )s and d   (1  aFBd )d
have the same sign as ( 1).12 The policy is now solely determined by paternalistic
considerations. When parents have the larger bargaining weight in the family, too much
informal care is provided and both modes of formal care, home and institutional, have
11This comparison is made when formal home care is at its rst-best level.
12As long as w   p > 0 which we assume.
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to be subsidized. The opposite result obtains when children have the larger weight. No
policy intervention is needed when  = 1.
In the general case, when  6= 1 and  > 0, both the e¢ ciency and paternalistic
(weight-related) e¤ects are relevant. They reinforce each other when  > 1 so that
all the net subsidies are positive and exceed the Pigouvian levels. Daughters are now
subject to a double jeopardy and su¤er both from the social norm and from their lower
weight in the family. Sons, on the other hand, do not care about the social norm but
their informal care contributes to the externality (which is not accounted for in their
private decision). In addition, their informal care is inated (compared to the utilitarian
benchmark) by the higher weight of the parents. To sum up, too much informal care is
provided in the LF and this calls for subsidies on all modes of formal care.
Finally, when  < 1 e¢ ciency and paternalism go in opposite directions. By con-
tinuity all net subsidies will remain positive when  is su¢ ciently close to 1, but the
signs may be reversed when  is su¢ ciently small.
Note that except when  = 1, subsidies must be gender-specic. Because of the
gender wage gap we have s > d when  > 1 while  < 1 yields the opposite result,
namely s < d. In this case formal home care may have to be subsidized in families
with at least one daughter, while it is taxed in two-son families; see expressions (15)
and (18). This occurs when
1 

(w   p) < ' < 1 

(w   p):
The comparison across genders of the net subsidies on institutional care, on the
other hand, appears to be ambiguous.
The main properties of the optimal subsidies on formal home and institutional care
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal subsidies on informal care stated in Proposition 3 have the
following properties:
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(i) When  = 1, so that family and social weights coincide, we have s = d = s =
d = ' so that a uniform subsidy on all types of formal care which is set according
to the Pigouvian rule equal to the marginal social damage is su¢ cient.
(ii) When  = ' = 0 so that there is no social norm the subsidies on formal home
care and the net subsidies on institutional care, have the same sign as (   1).
The policy is then gender-specic and solely determined by paternalisticconsid-
erations.
(iii) In the general case, when  6= 1 and  > 0, both the e¢ ciency and paternalistic
(weight-related) e¤ects are relevant.
When  > 1, they reinforce each other so that all the net gender-specic
subsidies are positive and larger than the Pigouvian levels.
When  < 1 e¢ ciency and paternalism go in opposite directions and the
(net) gender-specic subsidies may even become negative.
7 Concluding comments
Dependency and the need for LTC are not new problems. However, until rather recently,
these topics have received little attention, both in the public debate as in the economic
literature. As explained by Cremer et al. (2012), much of this literature is empirical,
but there has been an increasing number of theoretical papers over the last few years.
Most of these papers look at the problem of LTC from the parents perspective and they
generally neglect welfare of the caregivers.13 More importantly, they remain agnostic
about caregiversgender, despite the fact that daughters typically pay the larger burden
of informal care. Since each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way the type of
13Konrad et al. (2002) consider parents and childrens decisions but concentrate on locational de-
cisions. Klimaviciute (2015) and Canta and Cremer (2017) take the welfare of caregivers into account
but continue to study the decisions from the parents perspective.
23
interaction between generations is likely to di¤er across families and altruistic, strategic,
exchange or norm based patterns can be expected to coexist in practice. Since an all-
encompassing model is still out of reach the approach so far has consisted in looking at
the various scenarios in isolation.
We continue with this tradition even though we take an otherwise completely un-
usual and fresh look at the issue of LTC. In particular, we view the provision of LTC as a
matter of family bargaining in which caregivers and their gender specic roles are a cru-
cial ingredients. In our setting we abstract from a number of issues which are important
and have been stressed so far in the literature (these include risk, insurance, mispercep-
tion and redistribution) to focus instead on the tradeo¤ between the caregiverswelfare
and their parents needs (or preferences) for informal care. While crowding out of in-
formal care by social (or private) insurance represents a major concern in the existing
literature, our paper shows that this view can be misleading. When daughters feel com-
pelled to provide informal care, even in a globally cooperative setting, there may well be
too much informal care and public policy ought to subsidize formal care, both at home
and in institutions even when issues of redistribution, risk or insurance are neglected.
While the existing literature has shown that various policies may be desirable in spite
of the crowding out, we argue that policies may be designed to deliberately discourage
informal care.
While we deal with gender-specic informal care, it is important to keep in mind that
the paper is about ine¢ ciency and not gender equality per se. And while our policies can
mitigate the ine¢ ciencies brought about by these inequalities and particularly by both
the social norm and the gender wage gap, they have no leverage on the source of these
inequalities. The social norm is taken as given and, in our setting, there is nothing
that can be done about it. The natural next step would be to make it endogenous,
for instance by making it dependent on the behavior of previous generations like in
Barigozzi et al. (2017). More fundamentally still is the gender wage gap. As long as
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it is present, daughters will be ceteris paribus natural candidates to provide informal
care. While subsidizing formal care may provide a patch, only labor market policies
that address the gender wage gap can provide a cure. These are not included in our
model, but our analysis shows that they appear to be the only nal solution to the
problem that daughters provide an excessiveamount of informal care.
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Appendix
A First-best allocation
Informal care. The FOC of (7) with respect to ad is
1
2
F (c^sd)

p  w   I

1
2
F (c^sd)  1

+ u0(ad)  u0(1  ad)

  1
2
[1  F (c^sd)] 1
2
F (c^sd)
  1
4
F (c^dd)I
1
2
F (c^sd)  1
4
F (c^dd)
1
2
F (c^sd)  1
4
[1  F (c^dd)]2 1
2
F (c^sd) = 0
, w   p+ '+

1
2
F (c^FBsd ) +
1
4
F (c^FBdd )  1

I = u0(aFBd )  u0(1  aFBd ) (A1)
where ' in (A1) is obtained by collecting all terms multiplied by : The expression and
the economic interpretation of ' are in the main text (see expression (10) and comments
below).
The FOC of (7) with respect to ad1 is
1
4
F (c^dd)

p  w   I

1
4
F (c^dd)  1

   1
4
F (c^dd) + u
0(ad1)  u0(1  ad1)

  1
4
F (c^dd)
1
4
F (c^dd)
  1
4
[1  F (c^dd)]2 1
4
F (c^dd)  1
2
F (c^sd)I
1
4
F (c^dd)  1
2
[1  F (c^sd)] 1
4
F (c^dd) = 0
, w   p+ '+

1
2
F (c^FBsd ) +
1
4
F (c^FBdd )  1

I = u0(aFBd1 )  u0(1  aFBd1 ) (A2)
where ' in (A2) is again obtained by collecting all terms multiplied by :
Comparison of (A1) and (A2) reveals that aFBd = a
FB
d1 .
Finally, the FOC with respect to as1 is
1
4
F (c^ss)

p  w + u0(as1)  u0(1  as1)
  1
4
[1  F (c^dd)]2 1
4
F (c^ss)  1
2
[1  F (c^sd)] 1
4
F (c^ss)
  1
2
F (c^sd)I
1
4
F (c^ss)  1
4
F (c^dd)I
1
4
F (c^ss)  1
4
F (c^dd)
1
4
F (c^ss) = 0
, w   p+ '+

1
2
F (c^FBsd ) +
1
4
F (c^FBdd )

I = u0(aFBs1 )  u0(1  aFBs1 ) (A3)
Once again ' is obtained by collecting all terms multiplied by : Because of the gender
wage gap we have aFBs1  aFBs < aFBd so that aFBs < aFB < aFBd and I = 0. Hence, the
rst-best levels reduce to equations (8) and (9) in the main text.
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Critical costs. Let us now turn to the FOCs with respect to the critical cost levels.
Since the procedure is similar for all FOCs we restrict ourselves to the FOC with respect
to c^sd. It is given by
1
2
W^ 1sdf (c^sd) 
1
2
W 0sdf (c^sd) 
1
2
[1  F (c^sd)]  @a
FB
@c^sd
  1
4
F (c^dd)
@aFB
@c^sd
  1
4
[1  F (c^dd)] 2 @a
FB
@c^sd
= 0:
We have @aFB=@c^sd = (1=2)f(c^sd)aFBd so that the above equation reduces to
W^ 1sd  W 0sd  
1
2
[1  F (c^sd)] aFBd  
1
4
F (c^dd)a
FB
d  
1
2
[1  F (c^dd)] aFBd = 0:
Inserting the welfare levels, we can write
(p  w)aFBd   c^FBsd   aFB + u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]  'aFBd = 0: (A4)
Solving for c^FBsd yields expression (11) in the main text.
B FB implementation
Informal care. The laissez-faire informal care provision by daughters in type (s; d)
and (d; d) families is characterized by
w   p = [u0(ad)  u0(1  ad)]
with a subsidy d on formal home care this becomes
w  p+ d = [u0(ad)  u0(1  ad)] ,  1[w  p+ d] = u0(ad)  u0(1  ad):
The FB is given by
w   p+ ' = u0(aFBd )  u0(1  aFBd )
Implementing the FB ad then requires
 1[w   p+ d] = w   p+ ' , d = (  1)[w   p] + ':
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For  = 1, we have the subsidy for sons.
Critical costs. The laissez-faire informal care provision by daughters in type (s; d)
and (d; d) families is characterized by
c^sd = c^

dd  (p  w)ad + a+[u(ad) + [u(1  ad)  u(1)]]
with subsidies d and s on formal home care and a subsidy d on the nursing home
this becomes
c^sd = c^

dd  (p  d   w)aFBd   d + aFB +[u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]]
The FB is given by
c^FBsd = c^
FB
dd  (p  w)aFBd + aFB + u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]  'aFBd
Implementing the FB c^dd then requires
(p  d   w)aFBd   d + aFB +[u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]]
= (p  w)aFBd + aFB + u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]  'aFBd
, d = (1  aFBd )d + 'aFBd + (  1)[u(aFBd ) + [u(1  aFBd )  u(1)]]
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